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1 Introduction
In the digital age, firms are motivated to find ways in which new technologies
promote business longevity and competitiveness. One way to implement
new technologies is to integrate them in work processes. Allowing employees
to use modern technological tools such as information and communication
technologies (ICT), for instance, promises higher performance levels (Aral et
al. 2007). Thus, it is a common practice to integrate technical tools in the
daily work life of employees. ICT and its resulting scope of application, such
as the gathering of knowledge and data or the ease to communicate with
others (e.g. through email and mobile devices), lead to far-reaching changes
of work environments that are difficult to determine yet.
The objective of the present paper is to explore the impact of using dig-
ital ICT devices on workplace organization and especially on the allocation
of decision rights among employees at different hierarchical levels. From a
theoretical point of view, the impact of ICT on workplace organization is
ambiguous. On the one hand, theory suggests that ICT enable employees to
work more autonomously. An increase in employees’ autonomy in terms of
task execution, working time or working place is likely to foster work moti-
vation, which in turn promotes individual performance. On the other hand,
massive data storage and permanent accessibility via digital devices offer an
attractive opportunity for firms to raise their monitoring activities. An in-
tensive control of employees’ activities or performance, however, diminishes
individual autonomy as employees tend to adapt their working behavior in
order to meet corporate goals. Our empirical investigation, therefore, aims
at finding an answer to the question of whether digital ICT use either pro-
motes worker empowerment or worker monitoring, or whether digital ICT
even allow the implementation of these two seemingly opposite management
practices.
Although most economic studies of the impact of ICT on firm organization
highlight the forthcoming incidence of decentralization measures, we argue
in this paper that centralization measures may dominate decentralization
practices, and that a mix of both might also be applied. A gain in autonomy
through the use of ICT might get entangled in a knot of worker monitoring
policies for the purpose of controlling working crowds. To shed more light on
this issue, we first want to find out if both worker autonomy and monitoring
can be observed, which management policy prevails and, finally, whether all
employees are equally affected, irrespective of their hierarchical position.
We expect digital ICT to have a substantial impact on both decision
rights assignment policies. Moreover, we presume that worker autonomy
and monitoring are not equally affected by the use of digital ICT, i.e., the
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autonomy effect might dominate the monitoring effect or vice versa. Finally,
it is possible that the use of digital ICT leads to different decision rights
assignment effects across hierarchical levels. More precisely, the effect of
digital ICT on worker autonomy or monitoring might depend on whether
the concerned individuals are managerial or non-managerial employees. This
reasoning builds on recent studies highlighting that today digitalization com-
plements high-skill work, while simultaneously substituting for middle-skill
work (Gibbs 2017, Wolter et al. 2016).
To address this topic empirically, we utilize data of the Linked Personnel
Panel (LPP), which is a new linked-employer-employee data set on human
resources, corporate culture and management practices in German establish-
ments of the processing industry and the service sector. The LPP is represen-
tative for German establishments with at least 50 employees. The employer
and employee surveys are ideally suited to answer our research questions on
the impact of digital ICT on workplace organization, as they provide direct
measures of digital ICT (use of computers, the internet, laptops, tablet com-
puters or smart phones for professional activities), worker autonomy (amount
of job autonomy, opportunity to work from home) and monitoring (use of
appraisal interviews, performance evaluations, written performance targets).
Furthermore, the LPP provides a rich set of additional variables at both
the individual and the establishment level that can be applied to control for
worker and firm characteristics.
From a methodological point of view, we apply at first the conventional
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation approach. In order to account for
endogeneity issues, we additionally apply an instrumental variables (IV) es-
timation approach. All in all, we find empirical evidence for the argument
that both centralization and decentralization tendencies might appear si-
multaneously as a consequence of using digital ICT. According to the OLS
estimates, digital ICT are positively associated with worker monitoring, ir-
respective of the hierarchical level. In contrast, digital ICT are positively
associated with worker autonomy, but only for managerial employees and
not for non-managerial employees. The IV estimates tighten our results in a
manner that ICT increases both worker autonomy and monitoring, but only
for managerial employees and not for non-managerial employees. Moreover,
we find that within the group of managerial employees the ICT effect on
autonomy exceeds the corresponding ICT effect on monitoring. Altogether,
our results are in line with the view that digitalization unlike prior techno-
logical revolutions primarily affects the employment prospects and working
conditions for employees at higher hierarchical levels.
Our contribution to the empirical literature can be summarized as follows:
First, unlike existing empirical studies, we examine the impact of digital ICT
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on workplace organization, thereby explicitly addressing the potential differ-
ent effects across hierarchical levels. Second, while most other studies rely
on firm-level data, we make use of the LPP, a new German linked employer-
employee data set. Third, the use of the LPP enables us to emphasize the
employee perspective rather than the establishment perspective. This is im-
portant as comparable studies typically focus on the firm perspective, when
investigating the impact of ICT on workplace organization. Fourth, we con-
trast the paradox of managing worker autonomy and monitoring introduced
by Gilbert and Sutherland (2013) and argue that both seemingly opposing
policies may result simultaneously from using digital ICT. Consequently, we
ask whether one effect dominates the other. Finally, our estimation strategy
does not only provide evidence based on conditional correlations. In fact,
we additionally account for potential endogeneity issues regarding our main
explanatory variables, so our estimates can be interpreted as causal effects.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we discuss basic theoretical consider-
ations with regard to the impact of ICT on worker autonomy and monitoring.
Moreover, we summarize and discuss prior empirical work. Section 3 outlines
the data, variables and descriptive results. In Section 4, we map the empir-
ical investigation based on linked employer-employee data. Section 5 offers
some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical considerations and related lit-
erature
2.1 ICT and the battle between worker autonomy and
monitoring
The fast diffusion of modern technologies and IT systems promotes more and
more a digitalization of the working environment. The digital transformation
occurs on three interdependent levels (Mikfeld 2016). The first level is marked
by technological changes, promising an increase in an employee’s ability to
perform at a higher level. First of all, improvements in speed and capabili-
ties of ICT are constantly recorded (Lazear and Gibbs 2015: 190), allowing
an increasing degree of networking (Internet of Everything) and an enor-
mous central data storage (Big Data, clouds). Communication technologies
promote the spread of wired and wireless communication and coordination
within a firm (Bloom et al. 2014). Intranets and inter-firm networks facilitate
communication within and between firms (Smeets 2017). Following Moore’s
law that the performance of processors, memory and many other elements of
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computer hardware will be improving at an exponential rate (Brynjolfsson
and McAfee 2016), computer power is estimated to increase a thousand fold
until 2040 (Eberl 2017).
Next to ICT, the application of robotics and sensor systems allows the
implementation of artificial intelligence and algorithms that solve complex
problems (Mikfeld 2016). To some extent, modern technologies are already
used as a substitute for people (Lazear and Gibbs 2015: 194). Simple and
low-qualified activities are replaced by new technologies to enhance a com-
puterisation of labour (Hirsch-Kreinsen 2016). There will be a decline of
employment in routine-intensive occupations (Frey and Osborne 2013) and
a higher demand for skilled labor (Bresnahan et al. 2002). Today, high-
skill work is complemented by new technologies and middle-skill work is
endangered to be substituted. Employees need to focus more on tasks that
are difficult to automate and avert tasks that are easy to automate (Gibbs
2017).
New products, services, organizational structures or business models may
flourish on the second level - leading the economy from old to 4.0 (Mikfeld
2016). The quality of decisions, products and services will improve as firms
reduce the uncertainty and variation in production by applying new technolo-
gies that perform identically every time (Gibbs 2017, Lindbeck and Snower
2000). Moreover, hierarchical firm structures have to be reconsidered and re-
aligned in a more agile way as flexibility and innovation speed is increasing.
On the third level, cultural changes such as the need for more autonomy or
work-life-blending have to be considered in order to meet the expectations of
working digital natives (Mikfeld 2016).
As there is an increasing emphasis on the implementation of IT systems
such as ICT, firms are constantly raising their IT investments to enhance
productivity at the firm and at the individual level (Bertschek 2012, Draca
et al. 2007, Kretschmer 2012). From 2010 to 2016, producer prices for note-
books, for instance, decreased by 40% in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt
2017) making IT investments more profitable. A survey has shown that
on average 61% of German firms give their employees mobile devices that
connect to the Internet, as a way to provide access to email, corporate docu-
ments, and business software (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). This value is
steadily increasing with a firm’s number of employees. For instance, 94% of
German firms employing 250 or more workers distribute mobile devices for
professional activities. The increasing demand for ICT within a firm may
also be explained by a notable decrease in coordination, information and
communication costs (Malone 1997, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000).
Since the implementation of new ICT seems to influence the daily work
of employees as well as internal operating processes of a firm, it is consistent
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to highlight the relationship between ICT usage and workplace reorganiza-
tion. From a theoretical point of view, work organization can change from a
’Talyoristic’ work organization to a more ’Holistic’ organization. The former
entails a work organization characterized by task specialization, a pyrami-
dal hierarchical structure, monitoring and centralization of knowledge and
responsibilities. The latter presents a work organization with multi-tasking,
job rotation, decentralization of knowledge and decision-making authority,
team work, more flexibility for the employee and greater communication be-
tween workers (Martin 2011, Lindbeck and Snower 2000, Osterman 2000).
To clarify what type of workplace organization prevails - decentralization or
centralization - or if a mix of both is appearing, we consider in this study
worker autonomy and monitoring and contrast it to ICT use.
Autonomy, empowerment or self-management enhances intrinsic motiva-
tion as it is perceived by employees as a positive incentive to achieve results
through their own striving (Bader and Kaiser 2017, Gilbert and Sutherland
2013). Employees that are allowed to work autonomously, find greater job
satisfaction and attain a higher performance. With this in mind, firms need
to provide a proper incentive scheme and choose the optimal distribution of
knowledge and decision making authority. Thus, a change of the workplace
organization may foster a greater freedom in organizing one’s own work, and
lead to an increasing interest in the job and a higher performance (Caroli et
al. 2001, Greenan and Walkowiak 2005, Lindbeck and Snower 1996, 2000).
Innovative ICT offer new useful arrangements with more autonomy in
terms of task execution, working time or working place (Gibbs 2017). Knowl-
edge can be acquired at a favorable price (Garicano 2000). The scope of de-
cision making authority increases as the employee is getting more and more
knowledgeable and may be assigned with more responsibilities (Smeets 2017).
A nurse, for instance, may conduct cost-effectively own diagnostics with the
help of new technologies, thus works more independently due to technolog-
ical decentralization procedures. Jobs become more decentralized and are
complemented by technology. A higher skill level as well as problem-solving
and social skills are required to cope with an increase in decision making
authority (Gibbs 2017). Employees have to learn, develop, test and apply
their own ideas and solutions (Gibbs 2017, Lindbeck and Snower 2000). This
reasoning suggests that if digital ICT increases individual autonomy, man-
agerial employees are more likely to benefit from enhanced autonomy than
non-managerial employees, especially because of the assumed complementar-
ity between ICT usage, skills, knowledge, and responsibility.
On the one hand, we notice that the use of ICT can promote autonomy,
but, on the other hand, ICT may also lead to greater centralization. New
technologies such as ICT make it possible to monitor employees’ activities,
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to evaluate employees in new ways, and to reward employees’ performance
accordingly (Gibbs 2017, Dewettinck and Buyens 2006). Technologies such
as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or Location-based Services (LBS)
can be applied to record working time or to access in real time the current
location of employees (Krause 2016). Input-based (hours worked or tasks ac-
complished) or output-based performance (revenue, costs or profits) can be
measured (Lazear and Gibbs 2015) and the evaluation might be quantitative
or qualitative. Monitoring appears especially in highly automated jobs. In
this case, managers favor to make most or all decisions on their own. Pro-
cesses are going to be optimized and, as only few or no decisions have to be
made, employees only have to perform their prescribed tasks (Gibbs 2017).
The job of a delivery truck driver, for instance, is optimized in a way that
only few skills are required to fulfill the repetitive tasks. Little autonomy is
needed, and the business process is simple to monitor.
As monitoring is often the default management practice (Harris and
White 1987), managers have to grant employees autonomy within a set of
formal rules and procedures (Wageman 1995) along with the information
that monitoring may reduce the goal oriented behavior of employees, trust
and consequently employees’ performance (Taylor 2010). In general, the
joint implementation of autonomy and monitoring is paradoxical as the lat-
ter presents a negative incentive that may oppose the positive effect of the
former. Comparing the nurse and the delivery truck driver example, it de-
pends, for instance, on the specific industry if more autonomy or monitoring
is needed. Moreover, the culture of the organization, the presence of different
levels or functions, the personality, maturity or competence of managers and
employees, as well as leadership and risk tolerance play an important role
to determine whether a manager should adopt autonomy and/or monitoring
management practices (Gilbert and Sutherland 2013).
In the next subsection, we discuss recent empirical studies that highlight
the relationship between ICT and workplace organization.
2.2 Previous empirical evidence
Empirical results tend to promote the common and often stated understand-
ing that firms are currently implementing a more decentralized working en-
vironment. Nevertheless, recent findings are often ambiguous and thus un-
derline the necessity of further research to prevent a polarizing discussion.
The following background discussion will state different important findings
related to the research topic and summarizes the current status of the scien-
tific debate.
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998) concentrate on the relationship between IT
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and organizational design as well as on its consequences on firm productivity.
The authors analyze in depth what types of organizations are most likely to
gain from future decreases in the cost of IT. This is accomplished by using
a newly created cross-sectional survey of organizational practices conducted
in 1995 and 1996, matched to a panel of IT investment and productivity
metrics over the 1987-1994 time period. The data set contains information
of approximately 380 large U.S. firms. To determine a proxy for decentral-
ization, they focused on self-managing teams, the pace or method of work or
individual control, and on information about team incentives and skill acqui-
sition. IT measures, such as total capital stock of IT, computing power and
the number of PCs, were derived from the Computer Intelligence Infocorp
Installation Database. Next to a baseline production function regression and
corresponding robustness checks, an instrumental variables estimation model
has been conducted. Evidence has been found that firms with greater de-
centralization of decision rights show a greater demand for IT, and higher
benefits from IT investments are derived by firms using more decentralized
work systems.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) concentrate on new technologies and decentral-
ization of firms as well. The authors analyzed the principal-agent model to
determine the optimal degree of decentralization. The more the principal
knows about technologies, the lower the degree of delegation. Two French
data sets have been considered - the ’Changements Organisationnels et Infor-
matisation’ (COI) covering over 4000 manufacturing firms and the ’Enqueˆte
Re´ponse’ (ER) covering under 3000 French establishments, as well as one
UK data set - the 1998 ’Workplace Employee Relations Survey’ (WERS).
As a key measure of decentralization, information on the existence of profit
centers, delayering and the degree of autonomy a plant manager enjoys from
headquarters in investment decisions has been considered. ICT was measured
by an indicator of proximity to the technological frontier. The econometric
model is estimated by probit maximum likelihood. Further robustness checks
are carried out by using logit and linear probability specifications. The find-
ings show that firms closer to the technological frontier are more likely to
choose decentralization as they are dealing with new and relatively unknown
technologies.
Rasel (2016) examines the relationship between IT use, workplace orga-
nization and productivity for firms of different size. The unique unbalanced
panel data set of 3288 small and medium-sized firms as well as 595 larger firms
from the manufacturing and service sector in Germany includes measures of
IT such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), supply chain management
(SCM) and customer relationship management (CRM). Moreover, the share
of employees using computers for work has been used. Organizational design
8
is represented by measures taking into account the existence of profit cen-
ters, the loss of responsibility and self-managed working groups. Pooled OLS
estimates reveal that IT is used more intensively by small and medium-sized
firms with a decentralized workplace organization, but only larger firms gain
from the combination of IT and decentralization.
Some studies focused on flexible work practices as these HR practices
are more and more enhanced due to the intensive use of ICT (Bloom and
Van Reenen 2006, Hill et al. 2008). While some studies find evidence for a
positive effect of flexible work practices on employee effort or performance,
productivity and innovation (Bloom et al. 2015, Beckmann et al. 2017) and
thus support the concept of a more decentralized workplace organization,
others found that constant availability through modern ICT outside the reg-
ular working hours can cause work-family conflicts, job dissatisfaction and
health-related problems (Boswell and Olson-Buchanan 2007, Askenazy and
Caroli 2010). To shed more light on the matter, Viete and Erdsiek (2015) fo-
cused their attention on the complementarity between the use of mobile ICT
and workplace flexibility. Analyzing data on German manufacturing and ser-
vice firms from a survey on firms’ use of ICT and flexible working practices
conducted in 2014 and 2015 by the Centre for European Economic Research,
they found evidence that the use of mobile ICT is associated with a gain in
productivity in firms using trust-based working time. As an ICT measure,
the authors used the share of employees equipped by their firms with mo-
bile devices connecting to the internet. Three generic measures were taken
to describe workplace flexibility: working from home arrangements, working
time accounts and trust-based working time. Estimations were conducted by
using a conventional OLS estimation approach.
All studies mentioned above gear their attention on decentralization mea-
sures and underline the importance of a decentralized working environment
in order to benefit from technological changes or to cope with modern ICT.
Several other studies adopt, however, the assumption that a clear classifica-
tion between decentralization or centralization cannot easily be undertaken.
Colombo and Delmastro (2004), for instance, tried to identify the main fac-
tors that influence the assignment of decision-making authority over strate-
gic decisions to a plant manager or its centralization. A questionnaire was
mailed to plant managers of Italian manufacturing plants operating in June
1997. Thereby, the analysis could be conducted with information on the or-
ganization of 438 Italian manufacturing plants. As an estimation method,
ordered probit estimations with random effects are used. Considering ICT,
they found that adopting advanced communication technologies seems to fa-
vor a decentralization of decision-making. If monitoring is difficult due to
great physical distance, decision-making authority is centralized.
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Mahr and Kretschmer (2010) extended the line of research regarding the
optimal organizational structure by stressing that IT can be complementary
to greater centralization, conditional on the corporate learning type carried
out within a firm. Building on organizational theory, the authors differenti-
ate between two types of learning: exploration and exploitation. The former
refers to the permanent search for new products and markets, whereas the
latter focuses on the ongoing improvement of existing product market do-
mains. This approach is comparable to our procedure as exploration is rep-
resentative for more autonomy and exploitation for more monitoring. The
authors used a multi-source panel data set on computers, organizational de-
sign, and corporate learning type of over 250 German manufacturing firms.
To generate a decentralization measure, information on the decentralization
of decision rights and suitable HRM practices is used. As a key measure
for IT, the authors used information about the number of computers, gained
from Harte-Hanks’ CI Technology Database (CITDB). Moreover, a variable
has been computed combining tangible fixed assets and IT capital. To test
the hypothesis, a production function approach has been applied and OLS
estimations were conducted. As a result, Mahr and Kretschmer find that IT
is complementary to decentralization if the learning type is exploration. It is
complementary to centralization if the learning type focuses on exploitation.
According to Bloom et al. (2014), ICT have at least two distinct com-
ponents, information technology (IT) and communication technology (CT),
which should be considered separately. To determine the effect of IT and
CT on firm organization, a new data set has been considered that com-
bines manufacturing plant-level measures of organization and ICT across the
United States and Europe. Two other main sources of data were the ’CEP
Management and Organization Survey’ and the ’Harte-Hanks ICT Panel’.
To describe tendencies in organizational structure, questions about a man-
ager’s or a worker’s autonomy, as well as a manager’s span of control, have
been considered. Software data, especially the presence of three specific tech-
nologies (CAD/CAM and ERP as measures for information technologies, and
Intranet for communication technology) have been used to define IT and CT.
The authors applied an OLS estimation model as well as probit maximum
likelihood and instrumental variables regressions to find empirical evidence
for their hypothesis. The findings show that technologies that lead to low
information costs promote a decentralization of the organizational structure,
and technologies that lead to low communication costs promote a central-
ization. In addition to Bloom et al. (2014), Aral and Weill (2007) highlight
the same issue that different types of ICT can have distinct implications for
performance and organizational capabilities.
To sum up, previous empirical evidence considering the relationship be-
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tween ICT and organizational design is in general ambiguous. Furthermore,
the effects of technological and organizational changes at the employee level
are largely neglected. As organizational effects of ICT are not clear to date,
our study contributes to a better understanding about how ICT are changing
workplace organization while focusing on the employee perspective. In our
empirical investigation, we address the following research questions:
• Does digitalization promote more worker autonomy or more monitoring
on the employee level, or is digitalization associated with a mix of both?
• In case of a joint implementation of worker autonomy and monitoring
caused by digital ICT use, does one policy dominate the other?
• Does the impact of digitalization on worker autonomy and monitoring
exist for all employees, or are employees affected differently depending
on their hierarchical position?
3 Data, variables and descriptive results
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Linked Personnel Panel
(LPP), a linked employer-employee data set on human resources, corporate
culture and management instruments in German establishments (Bellmann
et al. 2015; Broszeit and Wolter 2015; Broszeit et al. 2016; Broszeit et
al. 2017). The LPP survey project is carried out by the German Institute
for Employment Research (IAB), the University of Cologne, and the Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW). Financial supporters are the IAB
and the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS). With its
debut in 2012/2013, the LPP survey circulates every two years towards its
recipients to collect information considering both the employer and employee
level. The first part of the LPP survey, the LPP establishment survey, is
conducted face-to-face by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung, whereas the second
part, the LPP employee survey, is realized via telephone by the infas Institut
fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften GmbH.
For representative empirical analyses, two panel waves are currently avail-
able. The first wave contains information on 1,219 establishments and 7,508
employees. For the second wave, 771 establishments were successfully recon-
tacted. Concerning employees, 3,271 were willing to participate in the survey
again and 4,011 employees were first-time respondents. Thus, in total 7,282
employees have been included in the LPP employee data set of the second
wave. All in all, the LPP is representative for German establishments with 50
and more employees in the processing industry and in the service sector. All
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waves may be merged with data from the German IAB Establishment Panel.
The IAB Establishment Panel provides information on labor market topics,
such as employment, wages, sales, bargaining levels, works councils, profit
sharing and investments, and includes more than 15,000 establishments each
year (Fischer et al. 2009).
In the present work, we will focus on the employees’ perspective captured
in the LPP employee survey. The LPP employee survey completes with its
questions the establishment survey, the first part of the LPP data set. It
covers topics on personal characteristics and employment, HR development,
work conditions and work loads, remuneration, loyalty, values and corpo-
rate structure. To clarify the digitalization effect on workplace organization,
information on the usage of ICT among employees as well as on centraliza-
tion or decentralization measures is required. The second wave of the LPP
employee survey delivers the required information.
In the following descriptive and econometric analysis, ICT is measured by
the LPP employee survey question ’Do you use digital information or commu-
nication technologies such as computer, the internet, laptop, tablet computer
or smart phone for your professional activity? ’. The variable ICT can take
on the value 1 or 0. In addition, we differentiate between lower and higher
hierarchical levels by considering the employment status. A survey question
asking whether an employee is supervising other workers or not is used in
order to construct the dummy variable supervisor. Using both variables,
we construct interaction terms that enable a differentiation between four dif-
ferent cases: The variable ICT 11 indicates the case where the employee is
a supervisor using ICT, i.e. ICT = 1 and supervisor = 1, whereas ICT 10
indicates the case where ICT = 1 and supervisor = 0. The employee uses
ICT, but does not hold a position as a supervisor. The other two variables,
ICT 01 and ICT 00, are indicating the case where ICT = 0 and the variable
supervisor equals either 1 or 0. In our regressions, the variable ICT 00 will
be used as a reference group.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for ICT , supervisor, ICT 11,
ICT 10, ICT 01 and ICT 00. For 6,793 employees, we observe that 79% of the
total amount of surveyed employees use digital ICT. In our sample, surveyed
employees are more often occupying a position without management responsi-
bility. Only 30% of all identify themselves as a supervisor. Further details are
given by the ICT interaction terms: 26.8% of the employees are supervisors
using ICT, 3% are supervisors not using ICT. 52.7% are ICT using employees
without management responsibility and 17.5% are employees without man-
agement responsibility who are not using ICT. We notice that 89.9% of the
supervisors use ICT, whereas only 75.1% of the employees use ICT. In other
words, managerial employees are endowed more frequently with ICT than
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables
Variable Mean Std.-dev. Min-Max
ICT 0.794 0.404 0-1
supervisor 0.298 0.457 0-1
ICT 11 0.268 0.443 0-1
ICT 10 0.527 0.499 0-1
ICT 01 0.030 0.170 0-1
ICT 00 0.175 0.380 0-1
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015, employee survey.
N = 6, 793.
non-managerial employees, confirming the complementarity between digital
ICT usage, skills, knowledge, and responsibility. Furthermore, this finding
is a first indicator that worker monitoring and worker autonomy might be
applied in different intensities among employees. Monitoring activities might
increase as ICT enable employees to carry out a larger number of tasks or
more specific tasks that need to be controlled. Furthermore, monitoring
activities can be conducted at a higher intensity if managers possess the nec-
essary technical equipment. These assumptions lead to a more centralized
workplace environment. Next to this, the usage of ICT enables employees
to work more autonomously, promoting a decentralization of the workplace
organization. However, the overall impact of ICT on workplace organization
remains unclear and a more profound research is necessary to shed more light
on this issue.
Concerning centralization, we focus on the following survey questions on
employee monitoring:
• ’Did you have an appraisal interview with your supervisor last year? ’,
• ’Did your supervisor agree with you on the objectives fixed in writing
during the appraisal interview? ’ and
• ’Is your own performance regularly assessed by a supervisor as part of
an agreed procedure? ’.
This leads us to construct variables, called Interview, Target and Perfeval,
measuring these monitoring policies. The variables take a value of one if the
monitoring activity takes place and zero if not. To create our measure of
worker monitoring Monitoring, we followed the double-standardization ap-
proach (see, e.g., Bresnahan et al. 2002) and converted the scores from the
three centralization questions to z-scores by normalizing each score to have
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of worker monitoring and worker autonomy
variables
Variable Mean Std.-dev. Min-Max
Interview 0.502 0.500 0-1
Target 0.353 0.478 0-1
Perfeval 0.488 0.500 0-1
Job Autonomy 3.934 1.031 1-5
Wfh 0.193 0.394 0-1
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015, employee survey. N =
6, 793.
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Finally, we generated the
sum of the standardized values and standardized the resulting outcome. By
using the definition of STD(x) = (x − x¯)/σx, our centralized workplace or-
ganization variable is defined as
Monitoring = STD{STD(Interview) + STD(Target) + STD(Perfeval)}.
Concerning decentralization, we took into account two survey questions
from the LPP employee survey describing job autonomy and empowerment:
• ’Does your job allow you to make a lot of decisions on your own? ’ and
• ’Do you work from home for your employer - even if only occasionally? ’.
Considering the first question on job autonomy, respondents could choose
between 5 grades: 1 = does not apply at all, 2 = does rather not apply,
3 = neutral, 4 = largely applies and 5 = fully applies. A variable called
Job Autonomy has been created, ranging from 1 to 5. For the second ques-
tion referring to working from home, we generated a variable Wfh, taking
a value of one if employees make use of working from home and zero if
not. To construct a measure of workers’ autonomy, we applied the double-
standardization approach on the two decentralization questions describing
job autonomy and working from home and generated the variable Autonomy
as follows:
Autonomy = STD{STD(Job Autonomy) + STD(Wfh)}.
By construction, both Monitoring and Autonomy have zero mean and
unit variance. The descriptive statistics of worker monitoring and autonomy
can be found in Table 2.
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Considering monitoring activities, 50% of the employees indicate that
appraisal interviews are conducted, 35% affirm that superiors agreed on ob-
jectives fixed in writing during the appraisal interview, and 49% indicate that
a performance evaluation has been conducted. Focusing on a worker’s auton-
omy, the mean of the variable Job Autonomy is 3.934. 19% of the employees
affirm that they are allowed to work from home, even if only occasionally.
The survey questions used in our empirical analysis are appropriate questions
to describe the distribution of decision making authority among employees
and monitoring activities within a firm. To the best of our knowledge, so far
no study has combined information on ICT usage across hierarchical levels
with information on worker autonomy or worker monitoring and revealed an
association between ICT usage and workplace organization, thereby focusing
on the employee perspective. By using data from the LPP that are combined
with data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we would like to reduce this
research gap.
4 Methods and econometric estimations
4.1 Econometric Model
In order to measure the impact of ICT on monitoring activities from the
employee perspective, we specify the following OLS regression model as a
first econometric strategy:
Monitoring = α0 + α1ICT
01 + α2ICT
10 + α3ICT
11 +Xβ + , (1)
The dependent variable Monitoring measures the monitoring activities
an employee faces while pursuing his professional activity. The correspond-
ing survey questions investigate the application of appraisal interviews, the
occurrence of written target agreements and a regularly performance evalu-
ation. Our main explanatory variables are three of the four ICT interaction
terms, i.e. ICT 01, ICT 10 and ICT 11. The coefficients α1, α2 and α3 must
be interpreted relative to the excluded reference group ICT 00. The matrix
X denotes a set of control variables.  is the stochastic error term with zero
mean and finite variance.
Analyzing equation (1), we assume that the use of ICT in general pro-
motes an increase in monitoring activities. ICT leads to more monitoring for
non-managerial workers if α2 > 0, while α3 > 0 indicates increasing moni-
toring activities for managerial workers. More monitoring activities indicate
centralization tendencies. In contrast, α2 < 0 (α3 < 0) would indicate that
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using ICT leads to less monitoring for non-managerial workers (managerial
workers), thus promoting decentralization tendencies. As the interaction
term ICT 01 refers to managerial employees who are not using ICT for their
professional activities, we assume that monitoring is limited due to the ab-
sence of ICT use, and expect α1 to be negative or insignificant.
Our econometric strategy to measure the impact of ICT on workers’ au-
tonomy is similar as in the prior econometric model. We consider here the
autonomy variable described in Section 3 as dependent variable. The ICT
interaction terms serve again as main explanatory variables. We specify the
following OLS model:
Autonomy = γ0 + γ1ICT
01 + γ2ICT
10 + γ3ICT
11 +Xβ + , (2)
where Autonomy represents our dependent variable, providing information
on an individual’s amount of job autonomy and the incidence of working
from home.
ICT increases autonomy for non-managerial employees if γ2 > 0, while γ3
> 0 indicates that ICT promotes autonomy of supervisors. More employee
autonomy indicates decentralization tendencies. Conversely, γ2 < 0 (γ3 <
0) would suggest that using ICT contributes to decrease the autonomy of
non-managerial employees (supervisors), thus promoting centralization ten-
dencies. Finally, not using ICT at all should lead to an irrelevant impact on
workplace organization, i.e. we expect γ1 to be insignificant.
To test the relationship between our dependent and main explanatory
variables, we include a rich set of control variables. Working on data from
the LPP data set entails the enormous advantage to use a rich variety of
potential controls, especially as the LPP data set may be merged to the IAB
Establishment Panel. Thus, X contains an extensive set of individual- and
establishment-level control variables for which we provide definitions and de-
scriptive statistics in the appendix. We included as controls individual char-
acteristics such as age, gender and nationality, but also job characteristics,
i.e. employment status (full-time or part-time, permanent or fixed-term),
actual working hours or working conditions. We also add establishment-level
information such as firm size, type of firm structure, sector affiliation and
region, remuneration agreements, and leadership strategy. Finally, we con-
sidered control variables from the IAB Establishment Panel describing the
presence of works councils, the share of low and high skilled workers, the
ownership of a firm, and existing working contracts.
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4.2 Basic results from the OLS estimations
Tables 3 and 4 present the benchmark OLS results. Each table depicts a
different dependent variable and refers either to Equation (1) or (2). The re-
sults are received by using OLS, thereby estimating robust standard errors.
Three different stages are executed by adding step by step different sets of
control variables. The first set includes control variables based on employee
level information describing socio-demographic characteristics or personality
traits, job and workplace conditions, corporate culture, workplace contracts
or the big 5 personality traits. The second set of control variables consists
of variables that have been generated by using questions from the LPP em-
ployer survey and the IAB Establishment Panel. The number of observations
is declining due to limited data availability. At the beginning, we count 6,793
observations, at the second stage 6,130 and at the third stage 3,477 observa-
tions.
In Table 3, the empirical results are displayed for the worker monitor-
ing variable Monitoring. As theory predicts, ICT is associated with greater
monitoring of employees. In column (1), the variable ICT has a highly signif-
icant and positive impact. The size of the coefficient is 0.651, meaning that
the monitoring intensity - in the form of appraisal interviews with the super-
visor, written target agreements and regular performance assessments - for
employees using digital ICT devices is 0.65 standard deviations higher than
for non-ICT users. Adding control variables from the LPP employee survey
(column (3)) or from the LPP employer survey and the IAB Establishment
Panel (column (5)) does not change the significance level, but reduces the
magnitude of the coefficient - from 0.651 over 0.308 to 0.186.
In the next step, we examine the coefficients of the ICT interaction terms.
The coefficient of the variable ICT 01 turns insignificant after controlling for
individual characteristics, whereas the coefficients of ICT 10 and ICT 11 re-
main significant positive at the 1% level. This result is robust to including
further control variables from the LPP and the IAB Establishment Panel.
Both have a positive sign and take on the values of 0.179 and 0.325 (column
(6)), indicating a strong positive impact of using ICT on monitoring activi-
ties for both supervisors and non-supervisors (relative to the reference group
of non-managerial workers without digital ICT usage). All in all, therefore
the OLS results suggests that the use of mobile ICT is associated with more
monitoring for employees, irrespective of their hierarchical status.
The empirical results are in line with our theoretical assumptions. The
application of digital ICT on both hierarchical levels may be used to monitor
managerial and non-managerial employees more efficiently. This underlines
the assumption that digital ICT use leads to a redesign of the workplace or-
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Table 3: OLS estimates of worker monitoring
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICT 0.651*** 0.308*** 0.186***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.039)
ICT 01 0.161*** 0.097 0.109
(0.060) (0.065) (0.074)
ICT 10 0.629*** 0.314*** 0.179***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.042)
ICT 11 0.766*** 0.376*** 0.325***
(0.032) (0.040) (0.050)
LPP EE no no yes yes yes yes
LPP no no no no yes yes
IAB EP no no no no yes yes
R2 0.0686 0.0726 0.1655 0.1655 0.2814 0.2815
N 6,793 6,793 6,130 6,130 3,477 3,477
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015. Notes: The dependent variable is the double standardized
monitoring variable Monitoring referring to three questions on appraisal interview, fixed targets agree-
ments and performance evaluation. All columns are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respec-
tively.
ganization in a way that working processes and their corresponding outcomes
can be controlled more efficiently.
An alternative way in which ICT may affect workplace organization is by
promoting worker autonomy. To the extent that the usage of ICT increases
the possibility to gain knowledge we would expect it to increase the degree
of worker autonomy. We examine the relationship between ICT and worker
autonomy in more depth in Table 4, where the estimates of the variable
Autonomy are displayed. After adding control variables at the individual
and establishment level, we notice that the coefficient of the variable ICT
turns insignificant (column (5)).
Thus, we don’t observe empirical evidence here that underlines the as-
sumption that using ICT would promote an empowerment of workers. In
columns (2), (4) and (6), we consider the impact of the ICT interaction
terms. The variable ICT 01 is significant positive at the 1% level as well as
the variable ICT 11. The estimated coefficient of the variable ICT 10 is posi-
tive significant on the 1% level as long it is not controlled for establishment
characteristics. In contrast to the precedent results, the crucial point is here
to be situated at a higher hierarchical level, i.e., to be a supervisor. Only su-
pervisors seem to gain in job autonomy or may benefit from the opportunity
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Table 4: OLS estimates of worker autonomy
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICT 0.636*** 0.103*** 0.046
(0.026) (0.030) (0.038)
ICT 01 0.368*** 0.205*** 0.192***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.066)
ICT 10 0.512*** 0.089*** 0.021
(0.029) (0.033) (0.042)
ICT 11 1.041*** 0.377*** 0.342***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.048)
LPP EE no no yes yes yes yes
LPP no no no no yes yes
IAB EP no no no no yes yes
R2 0.0655 0.1189 0.2870 0.2871 0.3100 0.3104
N 6,793 6,793 6,130 6,130 3,477 3,477
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015. Notes: The dependent variable is the double standardized
autonomy variable called Autonomy referring to two questions on job autonomy and working from home.
All columns are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
to work from home, irrespective of whether they utilize mobile ICT or not.
Comparing our findings to the theoretical considerations mentioned in
Section 2, we may state that digital ICT is not found to increase employees’
autonomy in general. In fact, employees are found to be affected differently,
depending on their hierarchical position. More precisely, only managerial em-
ployees benefit from receiving more autonomy induced by digital ICT, while
the autonomy of non-managerial employees does not appear to be affected
by digital ICT. This finding highlights the importance of a complementarity
between digital ICT, skills, knowledge, and responsibility.
4.3 Robustness checks
We conducted a series of robustness tests presented in Tables 5 and 6. For the
first robustness check, a second monitoring variable Monitoring Intensity is
created, measuring the amount of employee monitoring. This variable simply
consists of the sum of the three scores from the monitoring questions used
before. Monitoring Intensity can take on a value between 0 and 3, thus
Monitoring Intensity ∈ [0, 3]. According to Table 5, the empirical findings
reinforce our basic results. Both dependent variables describing employee
monitoring support the hypothesis that using digital ICT leads to an increase
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Table 5: OLS estimates of worker monitoring: robustness check
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICT 0.794*** 0.378*** 0.225***
(0.030) (0.039) (0.047)
ICT 01 0.198*** 0.120 0.134
(0.073) (0.080) (0.090)
ICT 10 0.768*** 0.386*** 0.217***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.051)
ICT 11 0.934*** 0.462*** 0.393***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.060)
LPP EE no no yes yes yes yes
LPP no no no no yes yes
IAB EP no no no no yes yes
R2 0.0683 0.0723 0.1653 0.1653 0.2813 0.2813
N 6,793 6,793 6,130 6,130 3,477 3,477
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015. Notes: The dependent variable is the monitoring variable
Monitoring Intensity measuring the amount of employee monitoring and referring to three questions on
appraisal interview, fixed targets agreements and performance evaluation. All columns are estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
in monitoring activities, i.e., digitalization supports centralization tendencies
from the employee’s perspective. Moreover, we get very similar results for
the ICT interaction terms as before. The use of digital ICT is associated
with more worker monitoring, irrespective of the hierarchical level.
The second robustness check refers to our estimations on worker auton-
omy. For this purpose, we generated a further autonomy variable called
Autodigi. It is based on the following LPP employee survey question on
autonomous work structuring: Do technological innovations have given you
more freedom to decide how to structure your work? The question offers four
possible answers from not applicable to fully applicable.
Comparing the empirical results with our basic results on worker auton-
omy in Table 4, we obtain a close match considering the estimates for ICT .
In Table 6, the coefficients of ICT have a positive sign and are significant
on the 1% level (column (1), (3) and (5)). The idea that the use of ICT is
associated with increased worker autonomy appears to have some empirical
content. By contrast, the coefficients of the ICT interaction terms deliver
different results. While the coefficient of ICT 01 in Table 4 (column (6)) is
positive and highly significant, we get here an insignificant result. Moreover,
the coefficient of ICT 10 - insignificant in the precedent analysis - turned sig-
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Table 6: OLS estimates of worker autonomy: robustness check
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICT 1.128*** 0.945*** 0.891***
(0.042) (0.051) (0.064)
ICT 01 0.195* 0.148 0.205
(0.104) (0.112) (0.137)
ICT 10 1.114*** 0.963*** 0.917***
(0.046) (0.054) (0.069)
ICT 11 1.247*** 1.012*** 0.992***
(0.049) (0.059) (0.076)
LPP EE no no yes yes yes yes
LPP no no no no yes yes
IAB EP no no no no yes yes
R2 0.0515 0.0527 0.0693 0.0694 0.0771 0.0772
N 6,793 6,793 6,130 6,130 3,477 3,477
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015. Notes: The dependent variable is the autonomy variable called
Autodigi measuring the perceived autonomy with regard to work structuring. All columns are estimated
by an ordered probit regression model with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
nificant at the 1% level. These changes do not appear unexpectedly. We
interpret these empirical findings by referring to the difference between in-
dividual perceptions and the actual state. Whereas the variable Autodigi
indicates only individual perceptions about gaining more autonomy regard-
ing work structuring, the variable Autonomy in Table 4 describes actual facts
- such as if the job allows workers to make decisions on their own or if the
employer allows working from home. Thus, it is not surprising that more
autonomy induced by ICT cannot be perceived by managerial employees
not using ICT. Furthermore, both managerial and non-managerial employ-
ees perceive an increase in autonomy while using ICT for their professional
activity. However, the data based on real facts does not support this percep-
tion. In this case, an increase in autonomy depends only on the hierarchical
status of the employees.
Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variablesMonitoring Intensity
and Autodigi can be found in the appendix.
4.4 Instrumental variables estimation
The parameter estimates in equations (1) and (2), i.e., αi and γi (i = 1, 2, 3)
are only unbiased and consistent if the ICT interaction terms ICT 01, ICT 10,
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and ICT 11 are strictly exogenous. However, this exogeneity assumption is
not unlikely to be violated caused by endogeneity issues, such as omitted
variables, simultaneity, and selectivity. For example, digital ICT devices are
unlikely to be randomly assigned to both managerial and non-managerial
employees. In fact, managerial and non-managerial employees are likely to
differ systematically with respect to the assignment of digital ICT devices
based on observed and unobserved factors. In these cases, the ICT interac-
tion terms are itself functions of a set of individual characteristics, so they
have to be treated as endogenous explanatory variables in the monitoring or
autonomy function displayed in equations (1) and (2).
An appropriate response to the potential endogeneity of the ICT inter-
action terms is a structural model approach that allows for observed and
unobserved individual characteristics. Specifically, we can estimate the fol-
lowing four-equation system:
DRA = δ0 + δ1ICT
01 + δ2ICT
10 + δ3ICT
11 +Xβ + µ (3)
ICT 01 = φ0 + φ1ICT 01 + φ2ICT 10 + φ3ICT 11 +Xβ + ν1 (4)
ICT 10 = λ0 + λ1ICT 01 + λ2ICT 10 + λ3ICT 11 +Xβ + ν2 (5)
ICT 11 = θ0 + θ1ICT 01 + θ2ICT 10 + θ3ICT 11 +Xβ + ν3 (6)
Here, equation in (3) is the structural equation, while the remaining equa-
tions are the reduced-form (or first-stage) equations. DRA (Decision Rights
Allocation) indicates Monitoring or Autonomy, respectively. Apart from
the complete set of control variables X, the reduced-form equations include
three exclusion restrictions, i.e., ICT 01, ICT 10, and ICT 11, which are used as
identifying instrumental variables. The parameters are estimated using the
two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS), where the coefficients δi (i = 1, 2, 3)
in the structural equation are of particular interest.
To be valid instruments, the exclusion restrictions must significantly de-
termine the ICT interaction terms ICT 01, ICT 10, and ICT 11 without being
correlated with the error term µ in the structural equation. In the present
case, we choose group-specific mean values as technical identifying instru-
mental variables.1 The categories for generating the group-specific mean
values are age group, gender, worker status (blue vs. white color worker),
and occupational group. For example, ICT 11 represents the share of super-
visors using digital ICT devices among all supervisors of the same age group,
1The idea to use group-specific means as exclusion restrictions is quite common and
has been applied, for example, in Woessmann and West (2006).
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gender, worker status, and occupational group. ICT 11 is positively corre-
lated with ICT 11 by construction. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect
that the average number of supervisors using digital ICT devices within each
of these cells has an influence on an individual’s probability to be moni-
tored or being endowed with autonomy in any other way than through its
effect on ICT 11. In other words, ICT 11 satisfies the relevance condition by
construction and should also meet the exogeneity assumption regarding the
determination of DRA, thus representing a valid instrument for ICT 11. The
reasoning for the remaining group-specific mean values ICT 01 and ICT 10
applies accordingly.
The estimation results of our instrumental variables approach are dis-
played in Table 7. First of all, we see that the exogeneity test always rejects
the null hypothesis of exogenous explanatory variables. This indicates that
the OLS estimates are indeed inconsistent and emphasizes the necessity to
account for endogenous explanatory variables by applying an IV approach.
Furthermore, the first-stage regression results displayed in columns (1) to
(3) of Table 7 confirm the relevance of the group-specific means values in de-
termining the corresponding interaction term. Since the econometric model
is just-identified, a test of over-identifying exclusion restrictions cannot be
performed, which prevents testing the exogeneity assumption of the applied
instruments.
The IV estimates reveal a quite similar pattern for both dependent vari-
ables indicating monitoring activities and employee autonomy. As long as we
only control for individual characteristics, ICT usage significantly increases
monitoring activities as well as employee autonomy for both managerial and
non-managerial employees. However, once we additionally control for es-
tablishment characteristics, only the ICT effects for managerial employees
remain statistically significant, while the corresponding ICT effects for non-
managerial employees becomes insignificant.
All in all, our empirical findings suggests that digital ICT indeed promotes
both worker monitoring and autonomy, and not only one of these practices.
However, this does only hold for managerial but not for non-managerial em-
ployees. Despite the paradox of managing worker autonomy and monitoring,
firms obviously do not renounce the application of both management strate-
gies while augmenting the diffusion of ICT among employees. Thus, cen-
tralization and decentralization tendencies appear to occur simultaneously.
According to our IV estimation results, the digital ICT effect on the au-
tonomy of managerial employees is more pronounced than the corresponding
effect on monitoring. This finding can be explained by the attempt to find the
right balance between autonomy and monitoring. When worker autonomy
exceeds monitoring, the motivation and performance of managerial employ-
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Table 7: IV estimates of worker monitoring and autonomy
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Monitoring Autonomy
ICT 01 0.986*** 0.105 -0.026
(0.176) (0.202) (0.142)
ICT 10 0.039 0.825*** -0.072
(0.031) (0.078) (0.054)
ICT 11 0.038 -0.095 0.704***
(0.035) (0.106) (0.083)
ICT 01 -0.167 -0.176 0.102 0.239
(0.521) (0.455) (0.859) (0.497)
ICT 10 0.658*** 0.273 0.476** 0.478
(0.203) (0.262) (0.210) (0.294)
ICT 11 1.477*** 0.637** 2.016*** 1.462***
(0.328) (0.319) (0.344) (0.348)
LPP EE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
LPP no no no no yes no yes
IAB EP no no no no yes no yes
Exog. 15.397*** 7.19** 36.812*** 14.607***
test [0.002] [0.034] [0.000] [0.002]
R2 0.0592 0.1253 0.1783 0.0332 0.2595 0.1711
N 6,130 6,130 6,130 6,130 4,208 6,130 4,208
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/2015. Notes: The dependent variables are the double standardized
monitoring variable Monitoring referring to three questions on appraisal interview, fixed targets agreements
and performance evaluation, and the double standardized autonomy variable Autonomy referring to two
questions on job autonomy and working from home. Columns (1)-(3) display the first-stage regression results
belonging to the second-stage results displayed in column (4). Columns (4)-(5) present the IV estimations of
the second stage for the monitoring variable. Columns (6)-(7) present the IV estimations of the second stage
for the autonomy variable.The values in parentheses represent robust standard errors. The values in square
brackets represent p-values. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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ees are likely to increase, thereby fostering the complementary relationship
between digital ICT, skills, knowledge, and responsibility. Altogether, our
empirical results are consistent with other studies showing that digitaliza-
tion unlike prior technological revolutions primarily affects the employment
prospects and working conditions for employees at higher hierarchical levels.
5 Conclusions
The digitalization of workplace organization encourages firms to implement
modern technological tools into the daily working life of employees. Inno-
vative information and communication technologies, for instance, enable a
cheaper access to work relative knowledge and a faster communication among
employees. Using these ICT for professional activities promises higher perfor-
mance levels. In addition, work organizations become more and more flexible
as the use of ICT decreases the need to define total working hours (work-life
blending), work places (home office) and task execution. However, digital
ICT and its possible application to collect data, to record working time or
to track real-time locations - to name only a few examples - foster the at-
tractiveness of employee monitoring. This means that, on the one hand, new
work arrangements due to the use of digital ICT may increase an employee’s
autonomy, but, on the other hand, monitoring activities might increase as
well.
The objective of this paper is to highlight the impact of using digital
ICT devices on workplace organization. More precisely, we explore whether
using digital ICT leads to more monitoring or autonomy, or to an increase
in both management practices across hierarchical levels. Prior studies call
attention to a forthcoming decentralization of work structures, but neglect
to analyze work practices that lead to a more centralized workplace organi-
zation. However, with an increase in today’s monitoring possibilities, it is
important to juxtapose decentralization and centralization measures such as
autonomy and monitoring, to find out which policy prevails and if there are
differences of the impact of using ICT on worker autonomy and monitoring
across hierarchical levels.
Using new linked employer-employee data from the German Linked Per-
sonnel Panel and the IAB Establishment Panel, we applied an ordinary least
squares and, additionally, an instrumental variables estimation approach to
account for endogeneity issues. From the OLS estimations, we conclude that
using digital ICT is positively associated with monitoring activities, inde-
pendent of the employee’s hierarchical position. However, using digital ICT
is only associated with an increase in worker autonomy for employees at a
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higher hierarchical level. Thus, only managerial employees seem to gain in
autonomy when using ICT for their professional activity. The IV estimation
approach leads to more detailed results: The use of digital ICT increases
worker autonomy and monitoring, but only for managerial employees and
not for non-managerial employees. The digitalization of workplace organiza-
tion in the form of a diffusion of digital ICT among employees seems only
to affect managerial employees. In sum, our empirical results are in accor-
dance with the view that the employment prospects and working conditions
of employees at higher hierarchical levels are primarily affected by the digital
transformation. This is different to other technological revolutions during
which less skilled employees at lower hierarchical level were concerned.
One contribution of our study consists of highlighting the impact of dig-
ital ICT use on workplace organization from the employee perspective. Our
findings suggest that digital ICT promotes both worker autonomy and mon-
itoring. However, this does not necessarily mean that firms benefit from a
joint implementation of autonomy and monitoring practices as a response
to ICT diffusion. For future research, it would be interesting to extend our
analysis by the question if a joint implementation of worker autonomy and
monitoring policies has the potential to increase firm performance. Specif-
ically, there may be direct and indirect effects of implementing digital ICT
on firm performance, where the indirect effects may be mediated by worker
autonomy and monitoring.
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6 Appendix: Definitions and descriptive statis-
tics
Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
Monitoring variable (robustness check)
Monitoring inten-
sity
Dummy variable indicating the
amount of employee monitoring
1.348 1.221 0–3
Autonomy variable (robustness check)
Autodigi Do technological innovations have
given you more freedom to decide
how to structure your work?
1.540 1.222 0–4
LPP EE control variables
Age 25–39 Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees aged between 25 and 39
0.211 0.408 0–1
Age 40–54 Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees aged between 40 and 54
0.488 0.500 0–1
Age 55+ Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees aged 55 and above
0.275 0.446 0–1
Female Dummy variable indicating female
employees
0.290 0.454 0–1
Fixed-term con-
tract
Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees with a fixed-term working con-
tract
0.043 0.203 0–1
Part-time work Dummy variable indicating part-
time workers
0.136 0.343 0–1
Multitasking In my job I execute very different
tasks.
4.196 0.944 1–5
Physical demand-
ing task
My work is physically demanding. 2.373 1.487 1–5
Supervisor Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees with leadership competencies
0.298 0.457 0–1
Blue collar worker Dummy variable indicating separat-
ing blue collar from white collar
workers
0.368 0.482 0–1
Hours actually
worked
Number of hours actually worked
per week
40.811 8.729 1–90
Continued on next page...
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... Table 9 continued
Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
Shift work Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees with a shift work arrangement
0.306 0.461 0–1
Risk tolerance Ordinally scaled variable indicating
individual willingness to take risks
(0 = extremely risk avers, 10 = ex-
tremely willing to take risks)
5.682 1.824 0–10
Fair treatment My supervisor treats me with respect
in all aspects of my work.
3.944 0.932 1–5
German nationality Dummy variable indicating employ-
ees of German nationality
0.976 0.152 0–1
Envy I get angry if other people are unde-
servedly better than me.
2.633 1.295 1–5
Compassion I have a feeling of guilt if I am un-
deservedly better than other people.
2.329 1.166 1–5
Bad working condi-
tions
I am working under bad conditions
such as noise, extreme tempera-
tures, unpleasant lighting or smell.
2.819 1.557 1–5
Lifetime employ-
ment
I would like to work in this firm for
the rest of my working life.
4.108 1.128 1–5
Importance This firm is of great importance for
me personally.
3.761 1.177 1–5
Firm problems I consider the problems of the firm
as if they were my own.
2.806 1.313 1–5
Affiliation I am strongly affiliated to my firm. 3.901 1.159 1–5
Emotional commit-
ment
I am emotionally committed to my
firm.
3.796 1.201 1–5
Part of the family I feel as being ‘part of the family’ in
this firm.
3.776 1.206 1–5
Turnover intention How often did you thought of chang-
ing your current employer during
the last 12 months? (1 = every day,
5 = never)
4.412 0.920 1–5
Understanding The employees fully understand the
company’s goals.
3.791 1.026 1–5
Continued on next page...
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... Table 9 continued
Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
Trust Our supervisors trust their subordi-
nates.
3.850 0.992 1–5
Appreciation Our supervisors are appreciative of
their subordinates.
3.772 0.983 1–5
Discrimination No employee is discriminated due to
sex, age, nationality, religious affili-
ation, handicap, sexual orientation,
or skin color.
4.195 1.146 1–5
Extraversion 1 I am someone who is communica-
tive.
4.144 0.866 1–5
Extraversion 2 I am a convivial companion. 3.897 0.909 1–5
Extraversion 3 I am a reserved person. (reversed) 3.043 1.136 1–5
Conscientiousness 1 I am someone who does a thorough
job.
4.508 0.583 1–5
Conscientiousness 2 I am someone who tends to be lazy.
(reversed)
4.362 0.796 1–5
Conscientiousness 3 I am someone who executes tasks ef-
ficiently.
4.240 0.591 1–5
Neuroticism 1 I am a worrier. 3.260 1.159 1–5
Neuroticism 2 I am a nervous person. 2.503 1.102 1–5
Neuroticism 3 I am a relaxed person who can han-
dle stress. (reversed)
2.347 0.922 1–5
Openness 1 I am someone who produces new
ideas.
3.679 0.881 1–5
Openness 2 I am someone who values artistic
experiences.
3.235 1.185 1–5
Openness 3 I am someone who has a lively imag-
ination.
3.555 1.034 1–5
Openness 4 I am eager for knowledge. 4.145 0.773 1–5
Agreeableness 1 I am someone who is sometimes
a little rude to other people. (re-
versed)
3.749 1.107 1–5
Agreeableness 2 I am someone who can forgive. 4.205 0.725 1–5
Agreeableness 3 I am someone who treats others with
respect.
4.233 0.632 1–5
LPP control variables
Continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
U form Dummy variable indicating firms
with a functional organization struc-
ture
0.740 0.439 0–1
M form Dummy variable indicating firms
with a divisional organization struc-
ture
0.100 0.301 0–1
Firm size 50–99 Dummy variable indicating firms
with 50–99 employees covered by so-
cial security
0.320 0.467 0–1
Firm size 100–249 Dummy variable indicating firms
with 100–249 employees covered by
social security
0.336 0.473 0–1
Firm size 250–499 Dummy variable indicating firms
with 250–499 employees covered by
social security
0.176 0.381 0–1
Metal, electronics,
vehicle manufactur-
ing
Dummy variable indicating firms in
the metal working sector, in the
electrical industry or in vehicle man-
ufacturing
0.284 0.451 0–1
Trade, traffic, news Dummy variable indicating firms in
the trade, traffic, or news sector
0.154 0.362 0–1
Firm-related and fi-
nancial services
Dummy variable indicating firms
that offer firm-related or financial
services
0.152 0.359 0–1
Information and
communication,
other services
Dummy variable indicating firms
that offer information and commu-
nication services or other services
0.075 0.264 0–1
Eastern Germany Dummy variable indicating firms
that are located in Eastern Ger-
many
0.357 0.479 0–1
Southern Germany Dummy variable indicating firms
that are located in Southern Ger-
many
0.198 0.399 0–1
Western Germany Dummy variable indicating firms
that are located in Western Ger-
many
0.268 0.443 0–1
Hierarchy Number of hierarchical levels in a
firm
2.952 1.039 1–7
Continued on next page...
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... Table 9 continued
Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
HR level Dummy variable indicating whether
or not the human resources execu-
tive / chief human resources officer
(CHRO) is a member of the execu-
tive board
0.456 0.498 0–1
PFP Dummy variable indicating whether
a collective agreement permits vari-
able remuneration components for
employees covered by collective
agreement
0.613 0.487 0–1
Extra payment Dummy variable indicating whether
an establishment/office generally
makes voluntary payments, which
are not contractually agreed (e.g. by
collective agreement, work contract)
such as special payments or one-
time payments for special achieve-
ments of the entire staff
0.373 0.484 0–1
HR Staff Number of employees in the human
resource department of the corre-
sponding establishment/office
10.175 56.337 0–870
Independent firm Dummy variable indicating firms
that are economically independent
0.750 0.433 0–1
Cost leader Dummy variable indicating firms
that rather describe their business
model strategy as a cost leadership
strategy
0.065 0.247 0–1
Quality leader Dummy variable indicating firms
that rather describe their business
model strategy as a quality leader-
ship strategy
0.298 0.458 0–1
IAB EP control variables
Council Dummy variable indicating firms
with a works council
0.674 0.469 0–1
Low skill Share of low skilled workers 18.614 24.550 0–99.526
High skill Share of high skilled workers 10.313 14.157 0–86.207
Man owner Dummy variable indicating whether
a firm is led by managers or not
0.681 0.467 0–1
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Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
Fixed term Share of employees with a fixed-
term working contract
6.886 11.345 0–96.269
Temps Share of employees with a tempo-
rary working contract
3.720 7.631 0–73.260
Part time Share of employees with a part-time
working contract
14.174 19.845 0–100
Apprentice Share of apprentices 4.110 4.009 0–34.343
Women Share of female employees 31.758 24.328 0–98.182
Midi Number of employees receiving a
gross monthly salary between 451
and 850
0.867 3.908 0–83,380
One euro job Share of One-Euro-Jobs 0.232 6.392 0–177.143
Mini Number of employees receiving a
maximal remuneration of 450 per
month or being employed for a max-
imum of two months or 50 days per
year
3.008 7.683 0–87.475
Source: Linked Personnel Panel 2014/15 and IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations.
37
